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Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito*
Commercial law in the United States is designed to facilitate private
transactions, and thus to enforce the presumed intent of the parties, who
generally are free to negotiate the terms they choose.  But these contracts
inevitably have gaps, both because the parties cannot anticipate every situa-
tion that might arise from their relationship, and because negotiation is not
costless.  When courts are faced with these gaps in a litigation context, they
supply default terms to fill them.  These defaults usually are set to reflect
what courts believe similar parties would have agreed to if they had ad-
dressed the issue.  These “majoritarian” defaults are justified as being most
likely to carry out the presumed intentions of the parties.
Despite the frequent assertion that the defaults used by courts reflect the
views of most contracting parties, there is remarkably little empirical evi-
dence that they do.  Neither the legal scholars who study contract law nor
the business scholars who study business transactions seem to have ex-
amined whether important default terms really are those that parties actu-
ally prefer.  Statements by judges and scholars that these defaults are those
the parties would presumably have chosen do not appear to rest on any-
thing except the personal opinions of the writers.
This article attempts to remedy that situation by focusing on one very
important situation in which default rules are generally relied upon—and
then asking which rule the parties actually prefer.  In particular, we look at
how consumer purchasers of goods and services view the default rules that
apply when sellers tender an imperfect performance.  Do those purchasers
prefer a rule that allows them to insist on getting exactly what they sought
(a rule reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code’s concept of “perfect
tender”), or one that requires them to accept a performance that is reasona-
bly close to, but not exactly, what they wanted (the common law’s “sub-
stantial performance” rule)?  And does purchasers’ preference depend on
the goods/services nature of the product?  The UCC applies a perfect
tender standard for goods, and a substantial performance standard for
services.
To shed light on consumer preferences, we conducted three studies, re-
ported here.  These studies uncover a powerful consumer preference for
perfect tender in contracts for both goods and services.  Consumers reject
the idea that they have any moral or legal obligation to pay for things when
they did not receive exactly what was ordered, even where the failure relates
to an idiosyncratic preference rather than a difference in economic value
between the promised performance and what was tendered.
* The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of
Law, and Associate Professor, Department of Marketing, Hankamer School of Business,
Baylor University. The authors are grateful for research support from their respective
institutions. We have benefited from the helpful comments of participants in a panel at the
11th Annual International Conference on Contracts in San Antonio, Texas, in February 2016.
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These findings are important because they show that one very large
group of contracting parties (consumer purchasers) would not choose sub-
stantial performance as a default.  Because there is already ample historical
evidence that commercial buyers and sellers also prefer perfect tender,
courts need to reevaluate the claim that substantial performance is a stan-
dard that most parties would agree to.  While there may be good reasons
for courts to impose a substantial performance standard on parties, their
presumed preference is not one.
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INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that the primary purpose of modern contract law is to
facilitate and regulate commercial exchanges.  One of the chief reasons for
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code—still arguably the most suc-
cessful uniform law in American history—was to get rid of legal uncertain-
ties and help ordinary business people carry out the process of contracting
safely, efficiently, and predictably.  Or, as UCC chief architect Karl Llew-
ellyn put it, to aid business people and lawyers in “trouble shooting,
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trouble evasion and forward planning,” and to “promote sound, reasona-
ble, and decent business practices.”1
For example, American contract law, like that of every other modern
commercial law system, provides default rules for transactions.  Also
known as “gap-fillers” and “background rules,” these are terms that courts
apply to a transaction unless the parties agree otherwise.  Some contracts,
of course, are heavily negotiated and highly detailed, and attempt to deal
with every possible issue that could arise.  Most are not.  Parties to con-
tracts often do not even discuss some terms that may well be important—
place and time of delivery, time for payment, warranties carried by prod-
ucts being sold, or even (on occasion) the price.  If the parties have in-
tended to make a contract and have left one or more such terms open, the
law simply plugs in a default.2
Because contract law is supposed to help contracting parties achieve
their goals, drafters and judges have often sought to supply as defaults the
rules that, in their view, the “parties would have wanted” if they had spent
time discussing and agreeing on them.3  Such “majoritarian” defaults
make the contracting process more efficient by allowing parties to avoid
having to bargain over every aspect of their deal.  “Ideally,” in this view,
“the preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agree-
ments contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out
each detail of the transaction.”4  They also further the “freedom of con-
tract” ideal because they increase the chances that a party will get the deal
that he sought.  Because such defaults, to be valuable, have to be set in
advance, this traditionally has meant that they “should generally reflect
the contract term that most parties would have bargained for at the time of
the agreement.”5
Given that ideal, however, it is remarkable how little study has actually
been done of what contracting parties actually want.6  Although the osten-
1. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s At-
tempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141,
1146-48 (1985).
2. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (2002) (hereinafter “UCC”), for example, if
the parties do not specify a price, the time or place of delivery, the time for payment, or the
warranty on the products sold, the price will be “reasonable price at the time of delivery”
(§ 2-305), delivery will be at seller’s place of business (§ 2-308) within a “reasonable time”
(§ 2-309), payment must be made at the time and place the buyer gets goods (§ 2-310), and
the goods will carry a warranty of title and have no security interests (§ 2-310(1)), and (if the
seller is a merchant) a warranty that the goods are merchantable ((§ 2-310(2)).
3. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1989).
4. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983).
5. Duncan v. TheraTx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1021 (Del. 2001) (emphasis added).
6. There have been a few attempts, the best known of which—and still by far the
most cited—is a qualitative study of some fifty Wisconsin businesses, nearly all manufactur-
ers, done during the first years of the Kennedy Administration. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). Profes-
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sible goal of contract law is to help further business transactions, there has
been almost no interaction between those in business schools (who study
deal-making) and those in law schools (who study default rules).  Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that lawyers and scholars who are drafting default
rules often seriously misunderstand what contracting parties actually
want,7 and experience shows that important default rules are so unpopular
with most contracting parties that they are routinely overridden.8  While
the legal literature is rich with discussions of appropriate default rules,
virtually none of it focuses on asking parties what they want.  And while
the business literature on deal-making is equally robust, there seems to be
a lack of focus on default terms, even though they may have a significant
impact on the value of the deal.
This article addresses that gap.  Because the universe of default terms
is very large, we start this project by focusing on one of the simplest and
most ubiquitous: the standard of contract performance that a party must
meet to enable it to hold the other party to liability under the contract.
We believe this to be a particularly good default to begin with because the
standard of performance—how close must a party come to what it prom-
ised before it can collect under the contract?—is an issue that is raised in
every breach of contract case, and because U.S. law provides two distinct
defaults depending on the nature of the transaction.  As explained in more
depth below,9 the two are (1) “perfect tender,” the standard used in do-
mestic sales of goods, and (2) “substantial performance,” which is used for
(among other things) contracts for services.10  Note that both of these are
default standards.  Parties are free to specify substantial performance in
contracts for sales of goods, and to specify perfect tender in contracts for
services like home construction.  In the absence of agreement, however,
the defaults apply.
We focus here on the expectations of consumer contracting parties: do
consumers expect to get exactly what they bargain for (perfect tender)
when they sign a contract, or do they expect to have to take something less
than, but fairly close to, what they ordered (substantial performance)?
Does consumer preference depend on the goods/services nature of the
product?  We focus on consumer contracting parties not because we be-
sor Macaulay’s work was updated, though not extended, in John P. Esser, Institutionalizing
Industry: The Changing Forms of Contract, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 593 (1996).
7. A notable example of this, the battle over the “perfect tender” standard in the
UCC, is described in Part II, infra.
8. An example is the consequential damages default rule first developed in Hadley v.
Baxendale, which held that a party would be liable for all consequential damages that were
“foreseeable” from the breach. Parties of any degree of sophistication routinely contract
around the rule. See Hadley v. Baxendale [1854] EWHC J70 (Exch.),
9. See Part II, infra.
10. Substantial performance is generally the rule in all types of contracts that do not
involve domestic sales of goods, and a similar concept, “material breach,” is used in many
international sales of goods contracts, but for present purposes we will focus simply on sales
of services.
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lieve consumer views should be privileged over those of commercial par-
ties, but for four practical reasons.  First, the sheer volume of business-to-
consumer contracts in the American economy dwarfs the number of busi-
ness-to-business contracts, and the same contract law applies to both.
Thus, expectations of consumers would seem to be entitled to at least as
much weight as those of commercial parties.  Second, businesses are, be-
cause of their expertise and resources, better able to contract around de-
fault terms than are consumers, who are much more likely to be stuck with
default rules.  Third, many of the cases that have articulated substantial
performance rule have involved consumer buyers, including Judge Car-
dozo’s famous 1921 opinion in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, Inc.,11 in which he
emphasized that a private homeowner (like the defendant) who was hav-
ing a house built by a corporation would not really expect perfect tender,
but rather would ordinarily be willing to accept some defects.  Fourth, con-
sumer surveys are simpler and more straightforward to design and admin-
ister than are surveys of business contracting parties, and thus are a good
place to begin.
Thus, we ask consumers two questions.  First, which of the two rules do
you, as buyers, actually prefer if seller breaches a contract: (a) a regime
(perfect tender) in which you are entitled to demand exactly what you
want and pay only if you have received it, or (b) one in which you are
obliged to accept and pay for a defective performance (substantial per-
formance) so long as it is close enough to what you sought?  Second, does
consumer preference depend on whether the purchase is of a good or a
service, as the current American legal regime suggests?
What we find through a series of experiments detailed below is a
strong preference among consumer buyers for the perfect tender rule.  We
find strong support for this preference not only in situations involving
goods (where perfect tender is the default), but also in those involving
services (where substantial performance is the default).  We believe our
findings favoring perfect tender are important, given the ubiquity of sub-
stantial performance as a default in many consumer contracts, and the fre-
quent calls in the law literature to extend substantial performance to sales
of goods.  Our research suggests that while there may be good reason to
impose substantial performance as a default term on consumers, the per-
ceived preferences of those consumers is not one of them.
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, we provide a brief background
on the two default standards and the situations in which they are applied.
Second, we outline the methodology and the results of our empirical stud-
ies.  Third, we draw implications from those findings for the future discus-
sion of default rules in contract law.
11. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (N.Y. 1921).
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I. BACKGROUND
While many branches of American law regulate business transactions,
contract law is the one area in which the goal is to further business transac-
tions by empowering the parties to set their own terms and have them
enforced.  Contract law is a tool to be used by contracting parties.  Thus,
the goal of contract interpretation is to enforce the intent of the parties to
the transaction.12  Because agreements, no matter how explicit, can never
cover all of the possible issues that can arise, the law provides a set of
background rules—today often called “default” terms—that supply those
contract terms that the parties themselves did not specify.13  In keeping
with the idea that contract law aims to enforce the parties’ intentions,
these default terms have traditionally been set to reflect what the parties
themselves usually would have chosen under the circumstances.  Such
terms, as noted above, are often called “majoritarian default” terms, be-
cause they are assumed to be the ones that most contracting parties would
agree to if the matter were discussed and decided.14
Not all scholars agree that the law should provide majoritarian de-
faults.  Scholars have argued, for example, that we should penalize people
who do not fully negotiate their deals by giving them unfriendly terms;
this, it is argued, would encourage parties to reveal undisclosed prefer-
ences and information that would allow them to reach better deals.15
Others have suggested that modern technology could reduce the need for
12. See, e.g., Hanover Insurance Co. v. Northern Building Co., 751 F.3d 788, 792 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“In Illinois, the main objective in contract interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the parties.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 280 (Mem.) (2014); East Ridge of Fort Collins,
LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2005) (“It is axiomatic that a
contract must be construed to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties as determined
primarily from the language of the contract.”); Salce v. Wolczek, 104 A.3d 694, 698 (Conn.
2014) (“It is important to underscore that ‘[a] contract must be construed to effectuate the
intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of
the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction.’”) (quoting
Murtha v. Hartford, 35 A.3d 177, 182 (Conn. 2011)).
13. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F. 3d 398,
402 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 31:7 (4th ed. 2012)):
Contracts . . . are enacted against a background of common-sense understandings and legal
principles that the parties may not have bothered to incorporate expressly but that operate as
default rules to govern in the absence of a clear expression of the parties’ [contrary] intent.
14. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 608, 613-17 (1998).
The traditional [contract law] analysis concludes that default contract terms should
mimic those terms that the majority of contracting parties would agree upon if negotiat-
ing and drafting a relevant provision were cost-free. Default rules created according to
this process, often referred to as “majoritarian” defaults, minimize the number of occa-
sions in which parties will need to contract around default rules in order to arrive at an
efficient outcome. This approach minimizes the two forms of inefficiency that transac-
tion costs can create: inefficient contract terms and the transaction costs themselves.
15. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3 (arguing for a concept of “penalty de-
faults” that would compel parties to negotiate in situations where negotiation would be eco-
nomically beneficial).
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general defaults by allowing courts to tailor precise terms for individual
transactions.16
Whatever the merits of majoritarian defaults, it is clear that they are
the standard, and that they are justified as being what the parties them-
selves would have chosen.17  Thus, in this research we ask whether the law
does indeed reflect the choices of the parties.
A. The Standard of Contract Performance
The standard of performance for judging breaches of contract is a de-
fault term. Every contract involves a promise.18  The promisor’s task is to
perform the promise, or else compensate the promisee in damages.19  The-
oretically, at least, the promisee is supposed to get exactly what was prom-
ised.  From the seller’s perspective the evaluation is usually simple: the
buyer’s duty is simply to pay money, and usually it is easy to determine
when the amount paid is wrong.20  But from the buyer’s perspective, there
are many ways that the seller can fail to perform.  The bargained-for goods
or services may not be delivered at all, or they may be delivered late.
There may not be the right number of items, or the items might be the
wrong ones.  There may be the correct number of the right items, but they
might be defective.  Any such failure to perform is a breach of contract.21
Much of the time, a buyer will accept a defective performance when it
is not too serious.  People often shy away from controversy and may be
reluctant to complain.  There is inconvenience in arguing with a seller, and
16. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclo-
sure with Big Data, 12 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014) (arguing for use of technology and “Big
Data” to tailor legal default rules to the personal characteristics of individual parties).
17. See, e.g., Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Harold Wright Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 49 F.3d 308, 310 (7th Cir.
1995)) (default terms are those that “a court plugs into a contract to fill in a gap in a way the
court thinks the parties would have done had they thought about it”); Presidential Capital
Corp. v. Reale, 652 A.2d 489, 508 n.7 (Conn. 1994) (terms “are implied not because they are
just or reasonable, but rather for the reason that the parties must have intended them and
have only failed to express them”); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and
Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1631 (2009) (“With a few possible exceptions, contract
default rules are best understood as attempts to impute into contracts terms that most simi-
larly situated parties would have wanted to include had they considered them.”).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A con-
tract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)
(“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
if you do not keep it, — and nothing else.”).
20. See, e.g., Genesee Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 67 Ill. App. 673, 676 (1893) (stating that
paying $7.94 less than the full $500 contract price was a breach of contract).
21. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 314 (1932) (“A failure, without justification,
to perform all or any part of what is promised in a contract, is a breach thereof.”); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981) (“When performance of a duty under a con-
tract is due any non-performance is a breach.”).
42 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:35
the hassle may not be worth the ultimate improvement in performance.
The business literature has explored this phenomenon at length.22  Com-
mercial law scholars generally accept the idea as well.23
When a transaction goes bad and the buyer does not want to let it pass,
there are at least two things that it can do.  The more drastic and least
desirable of these is a lawsuit against the breaching party.  But the Ameri-
can system for resolving contractual disputes in courts is slow, cumber-
some, expensive, and risky.  And the process for resolving them in private
arbitration, is not exactly simple or inexpensive.  Most buyers will not
bring a lawsuit or an arbitration action.
By far the most useful and popular remedy is self-help: refusing the
good or service and refusing to pay for it—in effect, terminating the con-
tract.  This is often a very powerful remedy.  But it is also a dangerous one.
For the buyer’s own refusal to pay can itself be a breach of contract if the
seller’s breach was not the sort that justified rejection.
It is basic contract law that any failure to meet any obligation under a
contract is a breach.24  And any breach entitles the non-breaching party to
actual damages.  But not every breach allows a party to withhold its own
performance and terminate the contract.  In other words, there are some
breaches in which the non-breaching buyer must accept the defective per-
formance—reserving a right to sue for damages—or accept liability itself
for breach of contract.
22. See, e.g., John W. Huppertz, The Effort Model of Consumer Complaining Behav-
ior: An Update and New Research Directions, 27 J. CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFAC-
TION & COMPLAINING BEHAV. 2 (2014) (“In order for someone to initiate a complaint, the
level of dissatisfaction must be sufficiently high, the problem must be consequential, and the
consumer must believe that a reasonable probability of success will result. Otherwise it is not
worth the substantial amount of effort required to complain, and consequently the number of
complaints received by companies is low relative to the number of dissatisfied customers.”)
While customers may be reluctant to complain, many firms prefer to hear the complaints so
that they can respond appropriately. Customers who feel their complaints were dealt with
fairly tend to become quite loyal to the firm. Lea Dunn & Darren W. Dahl, Self-Threat and
Product Failure: How Internal Attributions of Blame Affect Consumer Complaining Behavior.
49 J. MARKETING RES. 670 (2012).
23. This is usually analyzed as a “waiver” (using the legal term) of strict performance,
or even as a “favor” (the transactional business term) to the other party. See, e.g., Jack W.
Graves, Course of Performance as Evidence of Intent or Waiver: A Meaningful Preference for
the Latter and Implications for Newly Broadened Use Under Revised UCC Section 1-303, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 235, 258-62 (2004) (explaining Karl Llewellyn’s analysis of contracting party
behavior).  The vast array of potential consumer responses to defects and the subsequent
responses of merchants is explored in two 1980 articles that had a substantial influence  on
modern scholarship. See William L. F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emer-
gence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 261 (1980); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assess-
ing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525 (1980).  Modern theories of “relational
contracting” rely on the fact that parties routinely do not insist on the technical details of
performance. See generally David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-
Operation as the Implicit Second Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract, 11 TEX. WES-
LEYAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981).
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Thus, the question of which breaches allow the buyer to rescind is criti-
cal.  That leads to the next key question: what standard do we apply to
determine whether the particular breach allows a party to refuse payment
and terminate the agreement?
B. Evolution of Two Standards of Performance
There are, as we noted above, two distinct default standards for con-
tract performance.  The reasons for the two standards are, in our view,
largely historical rather than policy-based.
At very early common law, virtually no breach by a seller—including
complete and deliberate failure to deliver the required performance—
would allow a buyer to withhold payment.  The buyer was required to pay
whether it had received anything or not, and its remedy was to sue the
seller for damages.25  This rule changed in the English courts in the last
years before the American Revolution, with the decision in Kingston v.
Preston.26  In that case, the Court of King’s Bench held that a party could
suspend its own performance and rescind if the other party failed to per-
form.27 The doctrine spread rapidly through the young United States.28
The ordinary rule thus became that a significant failure by the seller to
perform allowed the buyer to refuse to pay and walk away from the deal.
But from a very early date courts held that not every breach would
justify that remedy.  Thus, an English court held in the 1777 case of Boone
v. Eyre29 that where a seller had promised to sell a West Indies plantation
and several slaves to the buyer, the fact that the seller did not convey the
slaves along with the land did not release the buyer from his payment.
Similar court decisions, often citing Boone, became common in the United
States.30  By the end of the 19th century, a leading practitioner text noted,
“[e]very breach of contract confers the right of action upon the injured
25. See Nichols v. Raynbred, Hobart 88, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1615) (plaintiff sold a
cow to defendant for 50 shillings; plaintiff did not deliver the cow, but sued for the 50 shil-
lings anyway; the court held he was entitled to recover the money without any showing he
had delivered the cow).
26. Kingston v. Preston (1773) 99 Eng. Rep. 437; 2 Doug. 689.
27. Id.
28. See Johnson v. Applegate, 1 N.J.L. 271, 273 n. a ( N.J. Sup. Ct. 1794) (“Where two
acts are to be done at the same time . . . neither [party] can maintain an action without
showing performance of, or an offer to perform his part. . . .”); see, e.g., Ackley v. Richman,
10 N.J.L. 304, 310 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1829) (“no person shall call upon another to perform his part
of the contract, until he himself has performed all that he has stipulated to do as the consider-
ation of the other’s promises.”); Green v. Reynolds, 2 Johns. 207, 208  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807);
see also Leonard v. Bates, 1 Blackf. 172, 173 (Ind. 1822) (holding that seller who “could not,
or would not” convey property had no right to sue for the purchase money he was promised);
JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL
741 (Tompson Chitty ed., G. and C. Merriam 5th Am. ed. 1842).
29. Boone v. Eyre, (1777) 126 Eng. Rep. 160(a); 3 Geo. 17.
30. See, e.g., Hill v. Bishop, 2 Ala. 320, 322-23 (1841) (lessee of hotel was not excused
from performance even though lessor failed to make repairs that had been promised in the
lease); Bryan v. Fisher, 3 Blackf. 316, 319-20 (Ind. 1833) (same); Leonard v. Dyer, 26 Conn.
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party, but every breach does not necessarily discharge him from doing
what he has undertaken to do under the contract.”31  The line, however, is
not clear—the author simply notes philosophically that “[i]t is often very
difficult to determine whether or not a breach of one of the terms of a
contract discharges the party injured” from its own performance.32
Meanwhile, however, a parallel line of cases also developed, in which
courts instituted a rule that virtually any breach would justify rescission.
These cases involved contracts by merchants, primarily for the sale of
goods.  The principle shows up in some early cases,33 but it took deep root
in the latter part of the 19th century.  In Bowes v. Shand,34 another En-
glish case, the court held that loading rice on a ship between February 24
and March 3 did not meet the contractual requirement to load it “in
March and/or April,” and thus the buyer was not required to accept the
rice.  Merchants, said Lord Chairs, the Lord Chancellor, “are not in the
habit of placing upon their contracts stipulations to which they do not at-
tach some value and importance.”  Concurring, Lord Gordon noted:
 The question is a very simple one . . . . Now, the terms which are used in
these contracts are naturally the result of the intelligence of the merchants
who are engaged in making them and we may rely upon this, that they have
considered well the terms of the contract before they entered into it. . . . .
That being the case we must construe the contract itself, according to its
reasonable and literal sense, and I think we have no difficulty whatever in
doing so.  The safest rule in all these cases is to allow the parties who were
interested in making the contract to explain themselves.  It is our duty to ad-
here to the terms they have used . . . .35
These two lines of cases, which often seem to have passed each other
like ships in the night, are the ancestors of our two performance default
rules: substantial performance, and perfect tender.  Judge Cardozo’s Jacob
& Youngs36 opinion, archetype of the modern substantial performance
standard, relied heavily on many cases from the former category, most of
172, 178 (1857) (shipper was required to pay carrier who had failed to transport all of the
lumber specified under the contract).
31. WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 268, at 643
(1894) (St. Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1894).
32. Id. § 268.
33. See Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. J. Aron & Co., 16 F.2d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 1926) (L.
Hand, J.) (“There is no room in commercial contracts for the doctrine of substantial perform-
ance.”); see, e.g., Filley v. Pope, 115 U.S. 213 (1885) (American buyer of steel supposed to be
shipped from Glasgow not required to pay when conforming steel was actually shipped from
Leith, fifty miles away); Farrar v. Gaillard’s Administrator, 1 Miss. 269 (1827) (buyer who
contracted for ten slaves was not required to accept the nine tendered when one was miss-
ing); Dauchey v. Drake, 85 N.Y. 407 (1881) (agent who was supposed to insert ad into 1,075
newspapers could not recover when it only inserted ad in 1,022 and there were minor varia-
tions in the ads).
34. 2 App. Cas. 455, 463 (H.L. 1877).
35. Id.
36. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
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which involved consumer buyers.37  In such cases the buyer must accept
and pay for the performance unless the departure from the contract is will-
ful or is so “dominant or pervasive as in any real or substantial measure to
frustrate the purpose of the contract.”38  And Cardozo specifically noted
that a mere knowing failing to follow the contract requirements was not
necessarily “willful.”
The latter line of merchant perfect tender cases reached its apotheosis
with the drafting and promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code in
the 1940s and 1950s.  Although many of the Code’s drafters, including
Karl Llewellyn, strongly favored a substantial performance standard for
sales of goods, the merchants and their counsel who participated in the
drafting process strongly favored perfect tender.  The latter group won.
Section 2-601 of the Code specifically states that a buyer may refuse to
perform under the contract “if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in
any respect to conform to the contract.”39  From the first, many commen-
tators opposed the perfect tender standard, arguing that buyers should be
required to accept goods that had what the writers considered to be “triv-
ial” defects, because a bad-faith buyer might be tempted to reject goods
for alleged defects even when the real reason was that the buyer no longer
wanted the goods.40  On the other hand, some commentators defended the
perfect tender rule on the ground that it was just as likely that bad-faith
sellers would use a substantial performance standard to pass off defective
goods to buyers whose only remedy would be to sue for damages.41
Thus, we see that the law has developed two different standards of
performance—each of which is justified because it reflects the presumed
desires of the parties. Merchants who contract for goods are supposed to
desired perfect tender, while those buying services and involved in other
non-goods transactions are supposed to prefer substantial performance.
C. Consumer Expectations for Performance
At first glance, the intrinsic differences between goods and services
may lend some support for the distinct remedies for performance breach.
Compared to goods, services tend to be more vulnerable to variations in
quality. Services are performances. Just as theater performances change
37. See Spence v. Ham, 163 N.Y. 220, 57 N.E. 412 (N.Y. 1900) (homeowner having a
house built); Foeller v. Heintz, 137 Wis. 169, 118 N.W. 543 (Wis. 1908) (same); Woodward v.
Fuller, 80 N.Y. 312 (1880) (homeowner having construction work done to home); Glacius v.
Black, 67 N.Y. 563 (1876) (homeowner also having construction work done to home).
38. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. at 891 (N.Y. 1921).
39. U.C.C. § 2-601. There is one exception to this, which involves deliveries under in-
stallment contracts, where rejection can be made only if the defect “substantially impairs”
the value of the shipment or the contract as a whole. Id. § 2-612.
40. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 205-06 (1968).
41. A good roundup of the warring authorities and a defense of the perfect tender
standard is Jeffrey M. Dressler, Note, Good Faith Rejection of Goods in a Falling Market, 42
CONN. L. REV. 611 (2009).
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slightly from one show to another, so do services. Your hair stylist may not
replicate last month’s amazing cut on your next visit or with her next cus-
tomer. Part of the variability is because services typically involve interac-
tion between the customer and the service provider. The patient who can
articulately explain her aches and pains to the physician may get a more
meaningful diagnosis. Similarly, the enthusiastic customer who digs into
the whitewater on a rafting trip is likely to have a different experience
than a customer who is along for the ride.42 And the physical setting influ-
ences customers’ perceptions of service quality. Service customers are in
the service “factory” and necessarily pick up cues that influence their qual-
ity evaluations.43
While service quality may be challenging to deliver, it is not clear that
consumers are willing to tolerate inferior performance. As Leonard L.
Berry, arguably the father of service marketing, writes, “Consumers enter
a market for a reason – to be fed, to be entertained and to be transported.
An unreliable service fails to fulfill the customer’s need.”44 Emphasizing
service customers’ fundamental expectations of getting what they ordered,
Professor Berry continues, “Whereas poor reliability undermines custom-
ers’ confidence in the organization, consistent reliability is not enough to
exceed their expectations. Service organizations are supposed to be compe-
tent and reliable.”45 In other words, consumers expect service providers to
deliver on performance promises. Moreover, consumers generally expect
that the value they get (benefits less price and hassle) should be compara-
ble to the value enjoyed by the seller (profits).46 Consumers think that
service providers’ prices and profit margins, compared to manufacturers’
at least, provide ample cushion to finance quality performance.47 In sum-
42. See Eric J. Arnould & Linda L. Price, River Magic: Extraordinary Experience and
the Extended Service Encounter, 20 J. CONSUMER RES.  24 (1993).
43. See Mary Jo Bitner, Servicescapes: The Impact of Physical Surroundings on Cus-
tomers and Employees, 56 J. MARKETING 57 (1992) (“The ability of the physical environment
to influence behaviors and to create an image is particularly apparent for service businesses
such as hotels, restaurants, professional offices, banks, retail stores, and hospitals.”).
44. Leonard L. Berry, Revisiting Big Ideas in Services Marketing 30 Years Later, 30 J.
SERVICES MARKETING 1 3, 4 (2016).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint
on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986); Marielza Mar-
tins & Kent B. Monroe, Perceived Price Fairness: A New Look at an Old Construct, 21 AD-
VANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 75 (1994) (Consumers, guided by the ideal of equitable
distribution of gains and losses, expect their net gain (benefits less hassle) to be comparable
to sellers’ profits (prices less costs)).
47. See Lisa E. Bolton, Luk Warlop & Joseph W. Alba, Consumer Perceptions of Price
(Un)Fairness, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 4  474 (2003). (“Consumers are inclined to believe that
the selling price of a good or service is substantially higher than its fair price . . . [and] overat-
tribute price differences to profit.”); see also Lisa E. Bolton & Joseph W. Alba, Price Fair-
ness: Good and Service Differences and the Role of Vendor Costs, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 258
(2006) (“Consumers are rarely cognizant of the full array of a vendor’s nonmaterial costs and
are unwilling to subsidize those costs even when made salient.”).
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mary, consumers are likely to think it is unfair to be required to pay a
service provider for delivering a service that is different than that
promised.
Thus, while the law has developed two different standards of perform-
ance, it is not at all clear that consumers share that perception. This is the
subject of the study reported in this paper.
II. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
To understand consumers’ reactions to remedies when contracts are
breached, we used a scenario-based experimental design in which we
presented study participants with a purchase situation involving defective
performance and then asked a series of questions about the buyer’s duty
to pay for the purchase. We predicted that consumers would prefer perfect
tender, regardless of whether the purchase involved a good or a service.48
To test this prediction, we conducted a series of three experiments. The
first involved the purchase of what the law considers to be a “good”—a
smartphone case. The second involved the purchase of what the law treats
as a pure service—a concert ticket. And the third involved a mixed trans-
action involving goods and services—a restaurant meal.49 The experiments
were designed so that the seller’s defective performance did not signifi-
cantly affect the functionality or objective value of the goods, but related
primarily to the personal preference of the buyer.
We were interested in ways the scenarios shaped respondents’ percep-
tions of three primary variables: the consumer’s legal obligation to pay,
the consumer’s moral obligation to pay, and the consumer’s opinion of
what the ideal law on the subject should be. In addition to these primary
variables, we tested several secondary variables including age, gender, ed-
ucation, and income. These variables were intended to rule out any sys-
tematic demographic influences on attitudes. We also asked whether the
respondent or the respondent’s immediate family currently owned or had
in the past owned a business. This was to understand whether the respon-
48. While our prediction was based largely on the service quality literature, we also
considered anecdotal evidence, chiefly the usual reactions of first-year law students to similar
hypotheticals posed to them in law school Contracts classes. The reactions of these students,
who had not yet become fully immersed in the legal field, mirrored anecdotal reports relating
to merchant preferences for perfect tender. See, e.g., Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits
of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 526 (1987) (ex-
plaining strong preference of merchants for perfect tender during drafting of the UCC). Pro-
fessor Wiseman quotes the reaction of an officer of Macy’s department store to the idea of
substantial performance: “My Lord, what a chance for sellers to unload all their shopworn
and defective goods and then let a jury decide whether they can’t do it. It’s wonderful.” Id.
49. While many ordinary consumers may view preparing and serving meals in restau-
rants as quintessential “services,” restaurant meals are treated as goods for many purposes
under the UCC. See UCC § 2-314 (2012) (for purposes of the warranty of merchantability,
“the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is
a sale”); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, 198 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. 1964) (holding that sale
of bowl of chowder was a UCC transaction).
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dent’s real world role—strictly consumer or business owner and con-
sumer—influenced perceptions. We found no evidence that either
demographic factors or business ownership influenced results, and so we
do not discuss those factors further. Finally, we asked about how consum-
ers and sellers normally handled these conflicts to understand the influ-
ence of prevailing norms on respondents’ evaluations.
The survey was administered via the Internet with 279 business stu-
dents at a major southwestern university. Slightly more than half (53.4%)
of the respondents were male, and almost all (92.1%) were between 20
and 44 years. Nearly half (45.5%) had personal or familial experience as
business owners.
We randomly assigned respondents to one of six conditions (3 contexts:
smartphone case, concert ticket, restaurant meal; and 2 treatments: base-
line no-breach, seller-caused breach). Each of our study respondents saw
only one condition. In other words, a respondent saw the smartphone case
or the concert ticket or the restaurant meal scenario, not all three. And
within that study context, the respondent saw either the baseline no-
breach of contract scenario or the seller-created breach scenario, not both.
We compared responses between groups.50
A. Experiment One: Buying a Good – A Smartphone Case
1. Method
Respondents were asked to carefully read the scenario and indicate the
buyer’s obligation for payment. All respondents read the following:
A smartphone owner needs a new phone case before going on vacation. He
goes online and selects an expensive case. The case is available in several col-
ors including hot pink, lime green, ocean blue, and jet black. He selects a color
and orders the case.
Respondents in the baseline, no-breach condition also read:
When the case arrives, the customer discovers that the color is what he or-
dered. He leaves for his vacation tonight.
Respondents in the seller-caused breach condition also read:
When the case arrives, the customer discovers that the color is different than
what he ordered. He leaves for his vacation tonight.
The customer calls the store to request a refund, and explains that he received
the wrong color and that he will not use the case in this color. He explains that
50. In statistical parlance, this is a between-subject experimental design with random
assignment. It is considered to be a strong experimental design. Because subjects were ran-
domly assigned to the condition, it is unlikely that the raters in one condition hold different
attitudes than the raters in another condition. And because respondents were treated exactly
the same except for specific wording in the scenario they read, any difference in ratings be-
tween conditions may be attributed to the treatments themselves. The between-subject ex-
perimental design is stronger than alternative designs. For example, we could have shown a
single group of respondents all six conditions and then compared their answers to each condi-
tion. That is called a within-subject design. But within-subject designs carry the risk that
results may be contaminated by “carryover effects” such that responses to one condition are
influenced by thinking about another condition.
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the case is unused and is in the original packaging. The customer service rep-
resentative says it is against policy to accept returns.
We then asked respondents about payment obligations. Respondents indi-
cated their response by sliding a lever along a continuum.
Do you think the customer is morally obliged to pay for the phone case?
[Slider scale of 0 to 10 anchored by Definitely not morally obliged/Definitely
morally obliged]
Do you think the customer is legally obliged to pay for the phone case? [Slider
scale of 0 to 10 anchored by Definitely not legally obliged/Definitely legally
obliged]
Ideally, in situations like this, what should the law be? [Slider scale of 0 to 10
anchored by Require the seller to accept returns/Allow the seller to prohibit
returns]
2. Results
Recall that two groups of respondents read two different scenarios in-
volving the purchase of a smartphone case. The group of respondents who
read the scenario in which the transaction was completed as expected, with
the smartphone case arriving in the color requested (baseline, no-breach
condition) believed the buyer had both a high moral and a high legal obli-
gation to pay.51 On a ten-point scale, the legal obligation was rated 8.3 and
the moral 8.2; the difference is not statistically significant, meaning that
the difference is likely due to chance. However, when the seller caused the
breach by sending the wrong item, the perceived obligation to pay
dropped significantly. On a ten-point scale, the legal obligation was rated
5.4 and the moral significantly lower at 3.0. In other words, people feel
little moral compunction to pay when the seller creates the error, but they
believe the law might protect the seller’s behavior (Figure 1a).
Respondents across both treatments judged an ideal law as one that
would require the seller to accept returns, and the group who read the
seller-breach scenario were adamant about it. On a ten-point scale with
zero requiring the seller to take returns and 10 permitting the seller to
decide on a return policy, the no-breach group gave a rating of 3.3 and the
seller-breach just 2.0. In both cases, the ratings were statistically less than
5, indicating preference for a law that requires sellers to accept returns
(Figure 1b).
51. Analyses were conducted with univariate ANOVA using SPSS v. 21. The threshold
for statistical significance was set at .05; p-values (probability density function values) are
omitted from the narrative for ease of exposition.
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Thus we find consumers examining the purchase of a smartphone case
perceive a legal and moral obligation to pay for uneventful transactions.
When the seller breaches the contract, consumers anticipate a legal obliga-
tion to pay but feel little moral obligation. Consumers favor a law that
requires seller to accept returns. While this is particularly true in a seller-
breach situation, consumers facing no breach also prefer the opportunity
to costlessly back out of the transaction.
Consumers’ insistence on being able to return the product in the event
of a seller-breach is consistent with default contract rules that require per-
fect tender in the sale of goods. The default rule is different for purchases
of services: service buyers are required to accept a close substitute. And so
the next two experiments address consumer perceptions of faulty service
transactions.
B. Experiment Two: Buying a Service– A Concert Ticket
1. Method
Experiment 2 explored consumer perceptions about the purchase of a
concert ticket, a pure service. Respondents were asked to carefully read
the scenario and indicate obligation for payment. All respondents read the
following:
A music fan wanted to go to a concert by a popular band. He had friends who
planned to go. He ordered a single ticket using the concert hall’s website.
He specifically asked for a ticket in the 12th row center LEFT section, because
that seat was where his friends would be sitting. The concert was not sold out.
He received an email confirming the sale of one ticket in the 12th row center
left section. The ticket was delivered by mail two days later.
Respondents in the no-breach condition received no additional
information.
Respondents in the seller-caused breach condition also read:
When he opened the envelope, he discovered it was actually for twelfth row
center RIGHT—nowhere near his friends. He immediately contacted the
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ticket office and pointed out that this was the wrong ticket and asked for the
seat he was originally promised. The box office refused.
The fan did not use the ticket.
We then asked respondents about payment obligations under the circum-
stances. Respondents indicated their response by sliding a lever along a
continuum.
Do you think the fan is morally obliged to pay for the ticket? [Slider scale of 0
to 10 anchored by Definitely not morally obliged/ Definitely morally obliged]
Do you think the fan is legally obliged to pay for the ticket? [Slider scale of 0
to 10 anchored by Definitely not legally obliged/ Definitely legally obliged]
Ideally, in situations like this, what should the law be? [Slider scale of 0 to 10
anchored by Allow the fan to exchange the ticket/Allow the box office to
prohibit exchanges]
2. Results
As expected, the group of respondents who read the baseline scenario
in which the buyer got the ticket requested believed the buyer had both a
high moral and a high legal obligation to pay for the ticket. On a ten-point
scale, the legal obligation was rated 8.5 and the moral 8.2; the difference is
not significant. However, when the seller caused the breach by issuing the
wrong ticket and failing to correct the error, the perceived obligation to
pay dropped significantly. On a ten-point scale, the legal obligation was
rated 4.6 and the moral significantly lower at 2.8. In other words, people
feel little moral compunction to pay when the seller creates the error, but
they believe the law probably sanctions the seller’s behavior (Figure 2a).
We then queried our respondents about the ideal law addressing these
circumstances. Both groups favored a law that would require the seller to
accept returns, and the group who read the seller-breach scenario was
again more adamant. On a ten-point scale with zero requiring the seller to
take returns and 10 permitting the seller to set the return policy, the no-
breach group gave a rating of 3.4 and the seller-breach just 1.3. In both
cases, the ratings were statistically less than 5, indicating preference for a
law that requires sellers to accept returns (Figure 2b).
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Thus, as with the first experiment, we find consumers perceive a legal
and moral obligation to pay for uneventful transactions. When the transac-
tion is disrupted, consumers expect the breaching seller to make good on
the original promise. Consumers generally favor a law that requires seller
to accept returns. While this is particularly true in the event of a seller
breach, consumers facing no breach also prefer the opportunity to back
out of the transaction.
Under the default rule governing service transactions, buyers must ac-
cept the product as long as it is close to what was originally bargained for.
We find, to the contrary, that buyers feel no moral commitment to pay for
a service that is close to, but not exactly, what was ordered. Our results
indicate buyers believe the law should require the seller to deliver what
was originally ordered. Thus we have a gap between default rules and con-
sumer preferences. We further explore the gap with a third experiment
governing a mixed goods-service transaction.
C. Experiment Three: Buying a Service– A Restaurant Meal
1. Method
Our second experiment uncovered a gap between consumer beliefs
and legal default rules when it comes to service performance, and so we
conducted a third experiment to amass further evidence about consumers’
preferences. In this experiment, we explore consumer perceptions about
the purchase of a restaurant meal, an apparent service that is treated at
least to some extent as a good under the UCC.
Respondents were asked to carefully read the scenario and indicate
obligation for payment. All respondents read the following:
A diner entered a restaurant and was shown to a table by a waiter. After
looking at the menu, the diner ordered a sirloin steak with a baked potato and
green beans.
Respondents in the baseline, no-breach condition continued to read.
The waiter brought the meal.
The waiter later presents him with the bill.
Respondents in the seller-caused breach condition also read:
When the waiter brought the meal, however, it had French fries instead of the
baked potato that the diner had ordered. The diner asked again for the baked
potato. The waiter explained that the restaurant had run out of baking pota-
toes and only fries were available.
The diner didn’t want the steak with fries, and got up to walk out of the
restaurant.
The waiter presents him with the bill. He refuses to pay, saying that he did not
receive what he ordered and did not eat the meal.
We then asked respondents about payment obligations under the circum-
stances. Respondents indicated their response by sliding a lever along a
continuum.
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Do you think the diner is morally obliged to pay for the dinner? [Slider scale
of 0 to 10 anchored by Definitely not morally obliged/ Definitely morally
obliged]
Do you think the diner is legally obliged to pay for the dinner? [Slider scale of
0 to 10 anchored by Definitely not legally obliged/ Definitely legally obliged]
Ideally, in situations like this, what should the law be? [Slider scale of 0 to 10
anchored by Allow the diner to leave without paying/ Require that the diner
pay for the meal]
2. Results
Once again, the group of respondents who read the baseline scenario
in which the meal was served as expected believed the buyer had both a
high legal and a high moral obligation to pay. On a ten-point scale, the
legal obligation was rated 9.1 and the moral 9.4; the difference is not statis-
tically significant. However, when the seller caused the breach by failing to
serve the baked potato, the perceived obligation to pay dropped signifi-
cantly. On a ten-point scale, the legal obligation was rated 4.6 and the
moral significantly lower at 3.8. In other words, as with our other two sce-
narios, people feel little legal or moral compunction to pay when the seller
creates the error (Figure 3a).
Perceptions of an ideal law were influenced by the prime. Groups that
read the no-breach condition construed an ideal law as requiring the diner
to pay for a meal, whereas the group that read the seller-breach scenario
were adamant that the diner should not have to pay. On a ten-point scale
with zero permitting the diner to leave without paying and 10 requiring the
diner to pay for the meal, the no-breach group gave a rating of 9.6 while
the seller-breach group offered a rating of just 3.6 (Figure 3b).
D. Analysis
1. Summary of Findings
In each of the three scenarios involving a seller breach, the products
tendered by the seller were the functional and economic equivalent of
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what the buyer ordered. In each case, the buyer’s specification was based
on idiosyncratic preference that had no effect on the utility of the product
tendered—a different colored smartphone case, a less-preferred concert
seat (though of equal value), and French fries instead of a baked potato. If
the current legal default rules for performance in non-goods transactions
are truly majoritarian, we would expect to see that breached buyers should
face strong legal and moral obligations to pay in our first scenario (the
smartphone case) and much-reduced legal and moral obligations in situa-
tions involving pure services (the concert ticket) and the mixed goods-ser-
vices transaction (the steak dinner). The findings, however, do not support
the current legal default rules.
Across all three contexts, respondents perceived a substantial moral
obligation to pay for products during uneventful transactions (overall av-
erage = 8.6; smartphone case = 8.2; concert ticket = 8.2; restaurant = 9.4;
the three ratings are statistically identical). In the event of a performance
breach, however, the perceived moral obligation to pay dropped sharply
(overall average = 3.5; smartphone case = 3.0; concert ticket = 2.8; restau-
rant = 4.6; the smartphone case and the concert ticket were statistically
identical, and lower than the restaurant meal) (Figure 4, top panel).
Similarly, respondents perceived substantial legal obligation to pay for
products during uneventful transactions (overall average = 8.6;
smartphone case = 8.3; concert ticket = 8.5; restaurant = 9.1; all were statis-
tically identical). In the event of a performance breach, however, the per-
ceived legal obligation to pay dropped sharply (overall average = 4.6;
smartphone case = 5.4; concert ticket = 4.6; restaurant = 3.8; the
smartphone case and the concert ticket were statistically identical, and the
restaurant meal and the concert ticket were also statistically identical)
(Figure 4, middle panel).
Perspectives on the ideal law depended on the context. Respondents
facing uneventful transactions believed buyers should not be able to back
out of paying for a restaurant meal (9.6) but favored requiring exchange
privileges for the concert ticket (3.4) and the smartphone case (3.2; statisti-
cally identical to the concert ticket). Across all three contexts, however,
respondents exposed to the breach scenarios favored return privileges
(restaurant = 3.6; smartphone case = 2.0; concert ticket =1.3, with the lat-
ter two statistically identical) (Figure 4, bottom panel.)
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Thus the differences in consumers’ views of their obligation to pay are
not consistent with the current default rules allowing substantial perform-
ance standards for services and perfect tender standards for goods. Essen-
tially, consumers experiencing a seller breach see little moral or legal
obligation to pay for either goods or services and favor legal protection
from such obligations.
2. Replication
To evaluate the generalizability of the findings, we replicated the ex-
periments with a second group of research participants. The research was
again conducted online, but with a larger and more diverse panel. We
tapped 406 respondents from the MTurk52 panel. Participation was re-
stricted to adults living in the U.S. Approximately half (47.8%) of the re-
spondents were between 25 and 34 years, and 84 percent were between 20
and 44 years. Participants were well-educated, with nearly half holding a 4-
year college degree or more (49.3% compared to 32.7% for U.S. as a
whole) and another 9.6% (compared to 28.4% U.S.) completing at least
some college. Median household income was between $40,000 and
$50,000, somewhat lower than the U.S. median household income.53 Par-
ticipants skewed male (60.2%).
Responses were consistent with those from our first sample, and so
details will not be presented here. This consistency offers some evidence of
the generalizability of the findings.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Findings
Our goal is to understand the acceptability of the current standards for
contract performance that prevail when parties do not otherwise specify:
perfect tender for sales of goods and substantial performances for service
contracts. Our research addresses two questions:
1. Which rules do consumer buyers prefer in the event a seller
breaches a contract that does not specify a performance standard:
perfect tender or substantial performance?
52. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online marketplace that connects re-
searchers with a pool of individuals (known as MTurkers or workers) willing to participate in
research surveys. MTurk workers earn a modest financial award for their efforts (here, fifty
cents) but many workers are principally motivated by the enjoyment and satisfaction of com-
pleting the research surveys. The MTurk workers are more diverse than the group tradition-
ally tapped for academic research, namely, college students. Because of the greater diversity
and the large pool, MTurk has become increasingly popular with academic researchers.
Moreover, responses from MTurkers are consistent with responses from more traditional re-
search samples, pointing to the validity of MTurk data. See Michael Buhrmester, Tracy
Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet
High-Quality, Data? 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3-5 (2011).
53. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULA-
TION SURVEY: ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (2014).
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2. Does that preference depend on whether the contract involves
goods or services?
We conducted a series of experiments using hypothetical scenarios to
gain deeper insights into consumer preferences. Our experimental method
offers advantages over a simple consumer poll. First, scenarios are stories.
Consumers engage more deeply with stories than with abstract questions,
and so we may expect more veridical responses. Second, experiments give
insight into cause-and-effect rather than simple correlation. Because our
respondents were exposed to a single condition (for example, a seller-
breach of a concert ticket transaction), we can isolate the effects of prod-
uct form (good or service) from cause of the breach (no-breach or seller-
breach).
B. Is Close Enough Good Enough? No!
The line of substantial performance cases rests on the notion that con-
tracting parties prefer a default rule in which buyers do not expect to be
able to demand exactly what they ordered from sellers, but are willing,
absent specific agreement otherwise, to be forced to take products that
differ in minor ways from what was ordered. We found, however, that 21st
century consumers, at least, strongly favor perfect tender. In our seller-
breach scenarios, consumers rejected a moral obligation to pay for a prod-
uct that was close to—but not exactly—what was ordered. This prefer-
ence, contrary to existing rules, does not depend on whether the thing
being purchased is a good or a service. While some differences appeared
across contexts, there was no evidence of systematic differences attributa-
ble to the goods-service nature of the products. To the contrary, in the
event of a seller-caused disruption, consumers treated the smartphone
case, a good, and the concert ticket, a service, alike. It is not clear why they
held somewhat different expectations for the restaurant meal, but the key
point for our present purposes is that even in this transaction there was
still strong support for a perfect tender rule.
We suspect that consumers’ observed preference for perfect tender is
influenced by several factors. Dealing with these at length is beyond the
scope of this paper, but we sketch them here as a guide to what we hope
will be further research.
1. Consumers in the modern world have little need to tolerate products
that fail to perform. It is possible that in the days before mass standardiza-
tion and the total quality management revolution, consumers were used to
goods of variable quality. In service fields like construction, pre-modern
building practices may have made customers more accepting of deviations
and defects, while modern construction techniques allow for much better
quality control. Today’s consumers may simply expect, in a way their pred-
58 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:35
ecessors did not, to be able to get exactly what they ordered and have the
goods or services perform flawlessly.54
2. More fundamentally, consumers may have developed a more pro-
nounced sense of entitlement over the past several decades. In a commer-
cial context, entitlement refers to the idea that certain consumers feel
deserving of special treatment.55 Consumer entitlement may be fueled by
a secular increase in entitlement in the society at large. Younger consum-
ers born between 1970 and 2000 and reared in a culture emphasizing self-
worth, self-esteem, and trophies for all, have been criticized as “more
egotistical, entitled, and overconfident than previous generations.”56 Con-
sumer entitlement may also be fueled by standard business practices in the
21st century, which emphasize putting customers first. Consumers have
come to expect that honest businesses will always strive to make sure the
customer is pleased with what is delivered, and therefore there may be a
strong expectation that if there is any problem, the seller will make things
right. The widespread practice of accepting returns for any reason may
well contribute to consumer beliefs. In general, entitled consumers focus
on their expectations from a service encounter, whereas less entitled cus-
tomers focus on the acceptability of service delivery.57 In terms of our
experiments, it may be that entitled customers focus on the baked potato
they ordered, whereas less entitled customers accept the French fries as a
suitable substitute.
3. The consumer movement that arose in the 1960s has emphasized the
primacy of consumers over producers. Rules from strict liability in tort to
54. Although beyond the scope of this paper, we note that the business world has
become much less tolerant of variations from contract specifications. Such innovations as
lean production and just-in-time manufacturing have made defects far more troublesome
than they were fifty years ago. See generally PAUL MYERSON, SUPPLY CHAIN AND LOGISTICS
MANAGEMENT 11-40, 77-104 (2012); SHOSHANAH COHEN & JOSEPH ROUSSEL, STRATEGIC
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 41-116 (2d ed. 2013). A standard overall introduction to the
field is RONALD G. ASKIN & JEFFREY B. GOLDBERG, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF LEAN PRO-
DUCTION SYSTEMS (2001).
55. Henry C. Boyd III & Janet E. Helms, Consumer Entitlement Theory and Measure-
ment, 22 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 271 (2005).
56. Kali H. Trzesniewski, M. Brent Donnellan & Richard W. Robins, Do Today’s
Young People Really Think They Are So Extraordinary? An Examination of Secular Trends
in Narcissism and Self-Enhancement, 19 ASS’N PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 181 (2008) (citation omit-
ted). There is a popular belief that entitlement is on the rise. Newspapers’ use of “sense of
entitlement” increased sixfold from 1996 to 2006. Ellen Greenberger et al., Self-Entitled Col-
lege Students: Contributions of Personality, Parenting, and Motivational Factors, 37 J. YOUTH
& ADOLESCENCE 1193, 1193 (2008). The empirical evidence for increased entitlement levels
is mixed, however. Trzesniewski and colleagues found no change in narcissism scores on stan-
dardized tests, whereas Twenge asserts, “[a]ll evidence suggests that narcissism is much more
common in recent generations.” JEAN M. TWENGE. GENERATION ME: WHY TODAY’S
YOUNG AMERICANS ARE MORE CONFIDENT, ASSERTIVE, ENTITLED – AND MORE MISERA-
BLE THAN EVER BEFORE 69 (2006).
57. See James J. Zboja, Mary Dana Laird & Adrien Bouchet, The Moderating Role of
Consumer Entitlement on the Relationship of Value with Customer Satisfaction, 15 J. CON-
SUMER BEHAV. 216, 217 (2016).
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detailed consumer protection laws have shifted the law from being pro-
producer (that is, developing rules that protect businesses against liability
to consumers for harm suffered by the latter)58 to pro-consumer. Where
once the law might have favored sellers who failed to do what they prom-
ised, modern law tends very much to favor consumers.
4. Consumers may intuitively understand the concepts that contract
law calls “relationship-preserving” and “end-game” norms.59 In most cases
of relatively minor breach, both consumers and businesses tend to simply
accept the defective performance, either because it is not a significant is-
sue (e.g., the hamburger arrived with pickles when it was not supposed to)
or the parties have an ongoing regular contractual relationship in which
there is some give-and-take in performance (e.g., a gardener who this time
forgot to edge the yard but who will be back next week). In this latter
example, each party may be willing to put up with some slack from the
other (the homeowner might need to put off payment for a few days some-
time in the future) and insisting on the precise performance might damage
the relationship. But in single-shot transactions such as the ones we sur-
veyed, there are no relationships to be preserved and the respondents are
told that the consumer in fact does not want to accept the performance, in
which case an “end game” norm—reliance on legal rights—kicks in. Thus,
consumers may often be willing to accept defective performance, but they
may not be willing to be compelled to accept it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current approach to contract default terms—taken both by courts
and by most legal scholars—accepts that defaults should ordinarily be set
to mimic what contracting parties would prefer if they had taken the time
to discuss the issue. Anecdotal evidence, as noted above,60 is that
merchants like the perfect tender rule because they believe (a) they them-
selves will deliver what they promise, but (b) their counterparties may not
be so scrupulous, and they may be stuck with inferior products.
Our study shows that ordinary consumers strongly prefer the perfect
tender rule in contracts for both goods and services. The preference is
strong in both contracts for goods (where it is currently the rule) and for
services (where it is not). Where the good or service tendered meets the
buyer’s precise specifications, consumers recognize (as expected) a power-
ful moral and legal obligation requiring them to pay. But when the specifi-
58. See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977) (The most canonical treatment of the notion that judges worked hand-in-
hand with mercantile interests to make the law more favorable to large businesses).; Richard
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 249
(1975).
59. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
60. Wiseman supra note 48, at 526.
60 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:35
cations are not met—even when there is no economic difference between
the values of the two performances—they feel no obligation to pay.
We are not suggesting that the perfect tender rule is a desirable de-
fault. Although well beyond the scope of this paper, we can imagine that
there are reasons a substantial performance rule might be a preferable
default.61 Our point is, rather, that judges and scholars who have justified
substantial performance as “what the parties want” are mistaken. Our
study strongly suggests that consumers want the right of rejection for any
defect in the performance. The standard justification for the substantial
performance standard is misplaced.
61. For example, imposing a substantial performance default might be viewed as a
penalty default to compel parties who really do want perfect performance to reveal their
preferences so that the counterparty can adjust the price accordingly if there is any doubt
about its ability to perform perfectly. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 91.  Substantial
performance might also be justified on ideas of judicial economy, by limiting contract litiga-
tion to situations where the defects are trivial—perhaps as an analogy to the old maxim, de
minimis non curat lex (“the law does not concern itself with trifles”). See also Skaff v. Mer-
idien N. Am. Beverly Hills, L.L.C., 506 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that initially
providing a handicapped hotel guest with a room lacking a roll-in shower caused no cogniza-
ble damage because the mistake was immediately corrected). On the other hand, of course, it
can be argued that the perfect tender rule is also a penalty default in that it forces one who is
not sure of its ability to perform to make that information know in advance so that the other
party is aware of the potential problem. And it is also possible that abandoning a bright-line
perfect-tender rule would increase, rather than reduce, potential litigation, due to the larger
number of matters in which one who fails to perform would be tempted to take its chances in
court rather than settle.
